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Transformative Constitutions and the Role of
Integrity Institutions in Tempering Power:
The Case of Resistance to State Capture in
Post-Apartheid South Africa
HEINZ KLUG†
INTRODUCTION
Post-conflict or
post-colonial constitutions
are
increasingly understood to be “transformative” constitutions.
While initially a term used to describe South Africa’s postapartheid constitutional order,1 the idea of a transformative
constitution may be best described as the adoption of a
constitutional order which is expected to “transform” the
existing pre-constitutional order. To this extent, these
constitutions are aspirational and are meant to empower the
newly democratized state to make significant changes to the
existing social and economic order. This perceived need for a
powerful state, to overcome the legacies of conflict and the
social conditions that divided the society, is in direct tension
with the liberal constitutional notion of limited government.
While constitutions establish and empower government,
constitutionalism is thought to ensure that government
continues to represent and respect the rights of the people in

† University of Wisconsin and University of the Witwatersrand.
1. See generally Karl E. Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative
Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 146 (1998).

701

702

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

whose name most constitutions are now created.
Limited government is often presented as a goal of
constitutionalism. While the organization of power has been
described as the “engine room” of the constitution, 2
constitutionalism implies that this power is managed by
distributing it among different institutions. Traditionally
this division of power is described as the separation of
powers, yet there is little consistency in the constitutional
manifestation of this institutional form. If some
authoritarian states, such as South Africa’s apartheid
regime, claimed adherence to the rule of law by focusing
simply on the formal procedural requirements for the
adoption of legislation regardless of its content, then
constitutionalists have looked to the separate allocation of
power as a means of ensuring that the different branches of
government are able to check one another and thus ensure a
more substantive version of the rule of law. These checks and
balances are seen as both the product and means of ensuring
a separation of the tres politica—the legislative, executive
and judicial branches—yet in practice, there is rarely a strict
formal separation. More often there is a close political
connection between the legislature and the executive,
especially when a single political party, by institutional
design or political fortune, spans or controls both branches.
The judiciary, by comparison is, in most cases, institutionally
more separate and judicial independence is held up as the
ideal.
This tension, between the organization and separation of
power, is at the heart of South Africa’s post-apartheid
constitutional order in which a popular, democratically
elected ruling party coexists with a constitutional promise of
democratic accountability. Structurally, the duty to ensure
accountability is constitutionally allocated to Parliament,
which bears the traditional legislative role of overseeing the

2. See ROBERTO GARGARELLA, LATIN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 1810–
2010 185–87 (2013).
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executive in addition to law-making, and to a range of
independent institutions that emerged from the particular
history of South Africa’s democratic transition. Furthermore,
as a constitutional democracy, the courts, and the
Constitutional Court in particular, are charged with
determining the allocation of constitutional authority and
resolving conflicts that might be brought to the courts as
different institutions struggle to ensure that there is legal
accountability for governmental failures as well as
individual malfeasance. This structure reflects an attempt to
institutionalize a system of checks and balances that relies
neither on a strict or formal separation of powers, nor does it
fragment power to the extent that it paralyzes governance.
Instead, it seeks to provide a constitutional system of
governance in which the government is empowered to
address the legacies of apartheid while also creating multiple
sites of power and authority to which political and social
groups in conflict may repeatedly turn in their attempts to
both be heard and to protect their interests or achieve, at
times, irreconcilable goals.
It is this creation of a constitutional order of multiple
independent institutions beyond the traditional tres publica
that provides the context in which this Paper seeks to explore
Martin Krygier’s idea of tempering power.3 Focusing on the
struggles over corruption and “state capture” that have
dominated South African political life for the last decade,
this Paper seeks to demonstrate that the existence of a
combination
of
“integrity
institutions”
and
the
Constitutional Courts development of a doctrine of
separation of powers that recognized the unique role of these
institutions were major factors in the ability of individuals,
non-government organizations, and opposition political
parties to “temper” the abuse of power that had begun to
undermine
the
post-apartheid
democracy.
Before

3. See Martin Krygier, Tempering Power, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RULE
(Maurice Adams et al., eds., 2017).

OF LAW 34
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considering the legal struggles that have marked this
process, this Paper explores the relationship between the
separation of powers as an idea, as well as constitutional
doctrine and the creation of integrity institutions in South
Africa’s post-apartheid constitutional order. This Paper then
discusses how the traditional forms of democratic
accountability were undermined by corruption and how the
integrity institutions and the courts were confronted by the
struggle over corruption in state institutions. Finally, this
Paper explores how the appellate courts, including the
Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court
interpreted the constitutional provisions creating the
“integrity institutions” and the Public Protector in
particular, as well as their separation of powers doctrine to
protect the role of these institutions against the political
branches attempts to shield the president from charges of
corruption. In conclusion, this Paper suggests that the idea
of tempering power is a productive framing to understand
the role of integrity institutions in South Africa’s
constitutional democracy.
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND INTEGRITY INSTITUTIONS
The goal of constitution makers in adopting the
separation of powers is often described as a means to avoid
the concentration of power and to “ensure accountability,
responsiveness and openness”4 in the practice of governance.
While the separation of powers cannot be found explicitly
enshrined in any single provision of the South African
Constitution, or in most other constitutions, it is a core
element in the structural design of the Constitution and is
expressed in the multiple provisions that create specific
checks and balances between the different branches and
institutions of government. Although traditional approaches
to the political idea and legal doctrine of the separation of
powers focus on the checks and balances between the

4. S. AFR. (INTERM) CONST., 1993, Schedule 4, Constitutional Principle VI.
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legislature, executive, and judiciary, the problem of political
and legal accountability is no longer contained solely within
these institutional parameters. Increasingly, constitutional
designers have created additional mechanisms and
institutions in their efforts in ensure the desired goals of
accountability, responsiveness and openness in the exercise
of governmental authority. These new institutions have
proliferated in new and amended constitutions since the late
20th century.
The inclusion of a plethora of new constitutional
institutions to address governmental accountability has
direct implications for any conception of the separation of
powers.5 On the one hand, the existence of these new
institutions makes it difficult to maintain a very formal
conception of the separation of powers as a trilateral system
of checks and balances between the three traditional
branches of government—the legislature, executive, and
judiciary. On the other hand, it also complicates a simple
functionalist approach which distinguishes between the
making, implementing, and interpreting of laws. Instead, the
task is further complicated by the fact that, in addition to the
different coordinate branches of government, modern
constitutions—and even some older constitutional orders—
are laden with institutions of governance that do not fit
neatly into either a formalist or functionalist conception of
the separation of powers. Instead, these different
institutions exercise public power relatively independent of
the three traditional branches, or at least they have a degree
of constitutionally protected decisional autonomy and
independence that is at odds with our traditional notions of
the trilateral structure of government.
The Origins of the Chapter Nine Institutions
The idea of creating independent institutions outside of
5. See generally Bruce Ackermann, The New Separation of Powers 113 HARV.
L. REV. 633 (2000).
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the traditional three branches of government in South Africa
had its origins in the democratic transition. Early on in the
negotiations towards a democratic transition, the idea of
creating an “ombudsman” to provide an avenue for
complaints and for the investigation of malfeasance and
maladministration in the state and its bureaucracy, and
even to protect fundamental rights, was reflected in the
proposals being made by the different parties. The scope and
nature of such an office remained, however, a matter of
debate.6 Furthermore, the idea of creating independent
governance institutions as a means of addressing the high
level of distrust between the parties and to enable specific
aspects of the transition was also being discussed.7 The
African
National
Congress
(ANC)
Constitutional
Committee’s working document on “A bill of rights for a new
South Africa,” published in 1990 specifically included the
establishment of an independent ombudsperson as part of
the section on the enforcement of rights “[w]ith a view to
ensuring that all functions and duties under the Constitution
are carried out in a fair way with due respect for the rights
and sentiments of those affected.”8
As the country prepared for its first democratic elections,
questions arose about the management of the elections. Up
until 1990, the government had organized and managed all
elections. However, serious concerns were raised about the
legitimacy of the first democratic election if the apartheid
regime was to conduct it, especially if conflict were to arise
over the results. On the one hand, the liberation movement
sought to resolve this problem by calling for the installation
of an Interim Government, as proposed in the internationally
sanctioned Harare Declaration. On the other hand, the
6. See S. AFR. LAW COMM’N, REPORT
(1991).

ON

CONSTITUTIONAL MODELS Ch. 23

7. See HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALIZATION
SOUTH AFRICA’S POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 119–21 (2000).
8. ANC CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE, A BILL
AFRICA 36–37 (1990).
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incumbent regime argued that there could be no handover of
power before a negotiated solution, insisting on legal
continuity between the existing state and any future legal
order. Faced with this irresolvable conflict, the ANC
embraced the option of creating a number of independent
bodies to oversee the transition to democracy, including an
independent electoral commission to manage the election
itself.
The democratic transition was thus facilitated in the
period leading up to the first democratic election by the
establishment of three independent institutions: the
Independent Electoral Commission, the Independent Media
Commission, and the Independent Broadcasting Authority. 9
The embrace of the concept of transitional mechanisms and
the legal institutions it spawned fit well in this period with
the
global
emphasis
on
expanding
democratic
constitutionalism. It also set the stage for the subsequent
embrace of the idea of “state institutions supporting
constitutional democracy” that became an important
innovation in South Africa’s 1996 ‘final’ Constitution.
Chapter Nine of the Constitution establishes six separate
institutions: the Public Protector; the South African Human
Rights Commission; the Commission for the Promotion and
Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic
Communities; the Commission for Gender Equality; the
Auditor General; and the Electoral Commission. These
institutions are part of a constitutional scheme that includes
structural and institutional elements designed to fulfill the
goals of effective democratic governance. Most significant to
the problem of accountability, however, are the three
“integrity institutions”: the Public Protector, the Auditor
General, and the Electoral Commission.
While a key structural feature of the Constitution is the

9. Heinz Klug, Constitution-Making, Democracy and the “Civilizing” of
Irreconcilable Conflict: What Might We Learn from the South African Miracle?,
25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 269, 277, 279 (2007).
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way in which power is both distributed and integrated in a
system of governance that is designed to both avoid the
paralysis of a rigid separation of powers and ensure
accountability by providing multiple avenues for democratic
and legal contestation, it is the “integrity institutions” that
have come to play a central role, together with the
Constitutional Court, in these processes. In addition to the
distribution and integration of power in South Africa’s
“federal” system of cooperative government, it has been the
integrity institutions that have been central to struggles over
accountability. Ensuring clean elections, fiscal integrity,
transparent procurement, and just administration are
constant sources of conflict at all levels of government as the
country grapples with the enormous task of addressing the
crippling legacies of colonialism and apartheid. The
Constitutional Assembly understood the role of these
institutional features of the Constitution as key to the
commitment to constitutional democracy, bringing them
together in an innovative and unique fashion in Chapter
Nine as “State Institutions Supporting Constitutional
Democracy.” At one end of the institutional spectrum, the
Electoral Commission, the Auditor General, and the Public
Protector are institutions primarily designed to ensure good
governance today, while on the other end, the Human Rights
Commission and the Commissions for Gender Equality and
for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural,
Religious and Linguistic Communities look both to the
present, yet also have an aspirational mandate in that they
are tasked with furthering the constitutional promise of
achieving a more equitable and sustainable society.
While these institutions have not always been effective
in performing their mandates during the first quarter
century of democracy in South Africa, it is important to
recognize that they do have a distinct role in ensuring that
the promises of human rights and good governance reach
down into the daily administration of the country and are not
merely the subject of five-yearly electoral contests or high-
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profile legal disputes. In order to achieve these goals, the
Constitution establishes all these institutions as
“independent, and subject only to the Constitution and the
law,” requiring them to be “impartial” and to “exercise their
powers and perform their functions without fear, favour or
prejudice.”10 Despite internal conflicts and complaints about
limited resources, the Chapter Nine institutions have
become an unquestioned part of the institutional landscape,
and despite the unique constitutional character of this
“fourth” branch of government, it has proven to be a valuable
addition in what has become from a global perspective, a
vibrant and contentious young democracy.
At the same time, the proliferation of new institutions
raises important questions about their institutional
authority and place in the constitutional system. What
exactly is the role of each of these institutions in the
achievement of democratic constitutionalism and how does it
fit within the realm of the separation of powers? Whether it
is questions of appropriate investigative capacities, reporting
and prosecutorial functions, or the appointment and
institutional independence of officials within these
institutions, the question of their constitutional status and
relationship with the other branches or institutions of
government quickly implicates the allocation and separation
of powers within the constitutional system. Nowhere has this
question been more salient than in cases challenging
malfeasance within the dominant political party. Along with
a complex institutional structure and an active civil society,
contestation over the scope of the constitutional powers of
these institutions, and especially that of the Public Protector,
has brought these questions to the center of the struggle over
the separation of powers and accountable government.

10. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 9, § 181(2).
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The Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the Separation
of powers
The Constitutional Court has repeatedly stated that the
history of the country and the Constitution requires a
particularly South African understanding of the separation
of powers. In October 2005, then Constitutional Court
Justice Kate O’Regan delivered the F W de Klerk Memorial
Lecture; she took the opportunity to discuss the Court’s
emerging separation of powers doctrine, concluding that a
variety of principles could be identified and “while clearly not
absolute,
the
doctrine . . . rests
on
a
functional
understanding of the powers and requires that each
institution’s character and competence to perform these
powers be protected.”11 In applying the doctrine, Justice
O’Regan argued, the courts “must remain sensible to the
legitimate constitutional interests of the other arms of
government and seek to ensure that the manner of their
intrusion, while protecting fundamental rights, intrudes as
little as possible in the terrain of the executive and
legislature.” Recognizing that there is no “absolute
separation of powers” the Constitutional Court’s doctrine
holds that “within the separation of powers each branch [of
government] has a specific mandate”12 and that the nub of
the separation of powers issue remains the interaction
between these distinct institutions, functions and powers.
Five years later, Justice Dikgang Moseneke noted in a
Constitutional Court judgment that the “Constitution makes
no express provision for separation of powers”13 but argued

11. Kate O’Regan Checks and Balances: Reflections on the Development of
the Doctrine of Separation of Powers Under the South African Constitution, F W
De Klerk Memorial Lecture (Oct. 10, 2005), in 8 POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC
L.J., no. 1, 2005, at 120, 145.
12. Sebastian Seedorf & Sanele Sibanda, Separation of Powers, in 1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA § 12-3 (Stu Woolman et al., eds., 2d ed.
2013).
13. Int’l Trade Admin. Comm’n v. SCAW S. Afr. (Pty) Ltd. (4) SA 618 (CC)
para. 90 (S. Afr.).
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that “[i]t is now clear from a steady trickle of judgments that
the doctrine of separation of powers is part of our
constitutional architecture” and that the “Courts are carving
out a distinctively South African design of separation of
powers.”14 This design, he argued, “must sit comfortably with
the democratic system of government we have chosen” and
“must find the careful equilibrium that is imposed on our
constitutional arrangements by our peculiar history.”15
Describing the design, Justice Moseneke noted that it must
both “give due recognition to the popular will as expressed
legislatively” and “ensure effective executive government to
minister to the endemic deprivation of the poor and
marginalized” but at the same time, “all public power must
be under constitutional control.”16 This requires that while
“[e]ach arm of the state must act within the boundaries
set[,]” it is for the courts to “determine whether unauthorized
trespassing by one arm of the state into the terrain of
another has occurred.”17
The effect of this “constitutional obligation” is that the
courts will regularly “confront the question of whether to
venture into the domain of other branches of government and
the extent of such intervention[,]” thus requiring the courts
to “observe the limits of their own power.”18 As a result,
Justice Moseneke argued “[t]he primary responsibility of a
court is not to make decisions reserved for or within the
domain of other branches of government, but rather to
ensure that the concerned branches of government exercise
their authority within the bounds of the Constitution.”19
Furthermore, in performing this function the courts are
restrained to the extent that “specific powers and functions

14. Id. para. 91.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. para. 92.
18. Id. para. 93.
19. Id. para. 95.
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[are entrusted] to a particular branch of government” by the
Constitution or by valid legislation.20 Justice Moseneke goes
on to warn that if the courts were to “usurp that power or
function by making a decision of their preference” they would
in effect “frustrate the balance of power implied in the
principle of separation of powers”.21
As South African academic commentators Sibastian
Seedorf and Sanele Sibanda argue, “understanding the
nature of each branch’s separate (or pre-eminent) domain is
as important for the theoretical and practical elaboration of
the separation of powers principle as the acknowledgement
of mutual checks and balances.”22 From this perspective,
they argue that “the principle of pre-eminent domain
protects the core functions and powers of each branch of
government against intrusions from outside, while other
intrusions are treated as checks and balances.”23 Even if the
notion that “there are certain matters that are pre-eminently
within the domain of one or other of the arms of
government”24 provides a useful guideline in the allocation of
constitutional authority among different institutions, this
does not resolve the more delicate question: what is the
extent of the constitutional powers of the courts who are
called upon to police these boundaries?
The Constitutional
Court’s
jurisprudence also
demonstrates how the structural features of the constitution
and hence the notion of a separation of powers evolves
through political and legal contestation for institutional
independence and integrity among the different spheres of
government. In the case of Van der Merwe v. Road Accident
Fund, the Court noted that in the “proceedings before the
High Court[,]” the relevant government Minister was “[f]or
20. Id.
21. Id. para. 95.
22. Seedorf & Sibanda supra note 12, § 12–39.
23. Id.
24. Id.

2019]

TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONS

713

some obscure reason” not a party before the court25 and then
pointed out that it had repeatedly emphasized that as a
matter of fairness in litigation “when the constitutional
validity of an act of parliament is impugned, the Minister
responsible for its administration must be a party to the
proceedings inasmuch as his or her views and evidence
tendered ought to be heard and considered.”26 Placing this in
the context of the separation of powers, Justice Moseneke,
writing for the Court, stated that “[o]rdinarily courts should
not pronounce on the validity of impugned legislation
without the benefit of hearing the state organ concerned on
the purpose pursued by the legislation, its legitimacy, the
factual context, the impact of its application, and the
justification, if any, for limiting an entrenched right.”27
Unlike those who argue that the separation of powers
implies the co-equal right of the different coordinate
branches of government to determine their specific powers,
in the South African context, the Constitutional Court has
the constitutional duty to make the final determination. The
clear implication is that a court should not pronounce on the
decision of another branch of government without first giving
the relevant branch an opportunity to justify the decision or
action as within its understanding of the constitution.
Respect for the views of state organs is evident too in the
rules of the Constitutional Court which require the joinder of
the relevant state authorities in confirmation proceedings;
Rule 5(2) explicitly provides that the Constitutional Court
“shall not make an order of constitutional invalidity of
legislation unless the authority concerned is joined as a party
to the proceedings.”28 This concern, that there be respect for
the role of other branches of government, takes on even

25. Van der Merwve v. Rd. Accident Fund 2006 (4) SA 230 (CC) para. 6 (S.
Afr.).
26. Id. para. 7.
27. Id.
28. Id. para. 8.
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greater urgency when dealing with the President of the
Republic. In Masethla v. President of the Republic of South
Africa the former Director-General of Intelligence, Billy
Masethla, claimed that his dismissal from his post was done
without legal authority and requested that the
Constitutional Court reinstate him to his position. 29 While
there was some debate on the Constitutional Court about the
source of legal authority relied upon by President Thabo
Mbeki in dismissing Masethla, the Court’s opinion made it
clear that given the context of the relationship between the
President and the head of the intelligence services, it was
appropriate to imply the power to dismiss as a necessary
component of the power to appoint since the President’s trust
and confidence in the head of intelligence is essential to the
constitutional structure and executive tasks involved. 30 This
case was not explicitly discussed as a separation of powers
issue, nor was the focus on the lack of formal legal rules
governing the relationship between the President and the
Director-General of Intelligence. Instead, the Court focused
on the factual context in which the President could not be
expected to rely on information coming from a person in
whom the President no longer had full confidence.31
In Van Abo v. President of the Republic of South Africa,
the Court was asked to review the government’s refusal to
take up a claim for diplomatic protection by a South African
citizen against the government of Zimbabwe for the violation
of his property rights.32 In this case the government chose
not to appeal a High Court order that the government should
intervene diplomatically on Mr. Van Abo’s behalf but instead
objected to the order’s determination that the President had
failed to perform his constitutional obligations. The
29. Masetlha v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC)
paras. 1–2 (S. Afr.).
30. Id. para. 68.
31. See id.
32. Von Abo v. President of South Africa2009 (5) SA 345 (CC) paras. 1–2 (S.
Afr.).
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Constitutional Court’s decision in Van Abo applied a
contextual approach to the question of presidential conduct,
holding that while the Department of Foreign Affairs stated
it was in fact engaged in diplomatic activities on Van Abo’s
behalf, there was no relevant Presidential conduct in this
case.33 The Court went on to point out that “[m]any of the
powers and obligations in section 84(2) [of the Constitution]
vest in the President as Head of State and head of the
national executive.”34 However, it continued by stating that,
while these are functions the President is constitutionally
required to perform, “[o]rdinarily they would be matters that
have important political consequences [which calls] for a
measure of comity between the judicial and executive
branches of the state.”35 Applying this approach to the case,
the Court held that the responsibility for foreign affairs is an
executive function and therefore the collective responsibility
of the executive and not presidential conduct “within the
meaning of section 172(2)(a) of the Constitution.”36
The interaction between appropriate comity and the
exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction arose again in a case
brought by the leader of the opposition in Parliament,
Lindiwe Mazibuko, who claimed that the Speaker of the
House and the ruling party were preventing the opposition
from tabling a motion of no confidence in the President. 37
Noting that “the importance of a motion of no confidence to
the proper functioning of our constitutional democracy
cannot be gainsaid[,]”38 the Court argued that “[t]he primary
purpose of a motion of no confidence is to ensure that the
President and the national executive are accountable to the
Assembly made up of elected representatives” and therefore

33. See id. para. 43.
34. Id. para. 37.
35. Id.
36. Id. para. 53.
37. Mazibuko v. Sisulu 2013 (6) SA 249 (CC) paras. 1 & 3 (S. Afr.).
38. Id. para. 21.
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“a motion of no confidence plays an important role in giving
effect to the checks and balances element of our separationof-powers doctrine.”39 Disagreeing with the argument
advanced by the Speaker “that the exercise of jurisdiction
would offend the separation of powers doctrine in light of the
ongoing negotiations within the Assembly[,]”40 the Court
stated that “[a]n order of constitutional invalidity would not
be invasive because it is declaratory in kind” and thus the
Constitutional Court “would be properly requiring the
Assembly to remedy the constitutional defect that threatens
the right of members of the Assembly” rather than
“formulating Rules for the Assembly”.41 In his opinion for the
Court, Justice Moseneke made it clear that there is a
distinction between a declaration of invalidity, which is a
decision clearly within the core function of the Constitutional
Court, and the formulation of the rules of parliamentary
procedure, which are within the domain of the legislature. A
declaration of invalidity in this context respects the
separation of powers in that the Constitutional Court is duty
bound to declare if any action is in violation of the
constitution—however, it does not violate the separation of
powers or the comity due to the legislature in that
Parliament is left alone to reform its own rules to correct the
constitutional defect.42
Concern that the judiciary remain cognizant of the limits
of its own authority in the context of the separation of powers
is especially evident in jurisprudence on the granting of
temporary restraining orders (TROs). This issue was
centrally addressed in the e-tolling case, National Treasury
v. Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance (OUTA), where the
impact of the High Court’s interim order was that the

39. Id.
40. Id. para. 67.
41. Id. para. 71.
42. Cf. Firoz Cachalia, Judicial Review of Parliamentary Rulemaking: A
Provisional Case for Restraint 60 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 379 (2015–16).
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“National Executive [was] prevented from fulfilling its
statutory and budgetary responsibilities for as long as the
interim order [was] in place.”43 Furthermore, the order
compelled the government to re-allocate otherwise budgeted
funds thus having “a direct and immediate impact on
separation of powers as well as ongoing irreparable financial
and budgetary harm.”44 In its analysis of the question of
temporary restraining orders, the Court pointed out that
“separation of powers is an even more vital tenet of our
constitutional democracy” empowering the courts to ensure
that “all branches of government act within the law.”45
However, in his judgment, Justice Moseneke immediately
stated that “courts in turn must refrain from entering the
exclusive terrain of the Executive and the Legislative
branches of Government unless the intrusion is mandated by
the Constitution itself.”46
Addressing the specifics of the litigation and the High
Court’s decision to grant an interim order, the Court held
that it is necessary, when probing the extent that the interim
order “will probably intrude into the exclusive terrain of
another branch of Government[,]” that the courts consider
“what may be called separation of powers harm”47 and that
“a temporary restraint against the exercise of statutory
power well ahead of the final adjudication of a claimant’s
case may be granted only in the clearest of cases[.]”48 While
the Court did not define the ‘clearest of cases,’ it did note that
an important consideration would be if the potential harm
involves the breach of fundamental rights protected by the
Bill of Rights. Since this case did not involve a fundamental

43. Nat’l Treasury v. Opposition to Urban Tolling All. 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC)
para. 27 (S. Afr.).
44. Id.
45. Id. para. 44.
46. Id.
47. Id. para. 47.
48. Id.
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right, the opinion went on to discuss the problem of the
separation of powers in the context of an interim order more
generally and cited the Constitutional Court’s statement in
Doctors for Life where the Court warned that:
Where the Constitution or valid legislation has entrusted specific
powers and functions to a particular branch of government, courts
may not usurp that power or function by making a decision of their
preference. That would frustrate the balance of power implied in the
principle of separation of powers. The primary responsibility of a
court is not to make decisions reserved for or within the domain of
other branches of government, but rather to ensure that the
concerned branches of government exercise their authority within
the bounds of the Constitution. This would especially be so where
the decision in issue is policy-laden as well as polycentric.49

Despite this stern warning, the Constitutional Court noted
that “this does not mean that an organ of state is immunised
from judicial review only on account of separation of
powers.”50 In a situation where a Court finds that the organ
of state has acted outside the law, then it would be
appropriate to grant an interdict since “[t]he exercise of all
public power is subject to constitutional control” and the
decisions under review “would in effect be contrary to the law
and thus void.”51 However, the Court later emphasized that
despite the difficulty courts might have in making some
policy laden and particularly polycentric decisions, when a
court considers “the grant of an interim interdict against the
exercise of power within the camp of Government [it] must
have the separation of powers consideration at the very
forefront” of its analysis.52
CORRUPTION, STATE CAPTURE AND THE UNDERMINING OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

Parliament’s first major oversight challenge occurred in

49. Id. para. 63.
50. Id. para. 64.
51. Id.
52. Id. para. 68.
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early 1996 when it was revealed in the press that the
Department of Health was spending R14.2 million on a
musical that was to tour the country providing education on
the growing HIV/AIDS pandemic, an expenditure that
represented a significant portion of the health department’s
HIV/AIDS prevention efforts. The musical itself, ‘Sarafina II’
was criticized for failing to impart a clear public health
message. But the scandal focused on the high costs of
production—including the salaries, luxurious facilities, and,
what was seen as, the inappropriate grandeur of the
production itself. When the Portfolio Committee first called
on the Minister of Health to justify this expenditure, she
purportedly refused to attend the hearing. After the
government realized the Minster’s refusal to attend would be
politically embarrassing, her appearance before the
committee merely demonstrated how new the concept of
oversight was for the legislature. First, the Members of
Parliament (MPs) relied mainly on press reports to challenge
the Minister, instead of demanding access to the official
documentation, which was their right. Second, the ANC
members remained extraordinarily passive, caught between
the exercise of their parliamentary duty and loyalty to the
government. As one ANC member later admitted, “It was
still early days. We did not know how to deal with something
like this. Perhaps we should be condemned for it, perhaps we
should be forgiven, but we were more concerned with damage
control than we were with parliamentary accountability.” 53
The Committee’s failure was further highlighted when the
Public Protector issued a report in June 1996 that
documented the mismanagement of tender procedures and
the “unauthorized expenditure of foreign aid” in this
project.54
Parliament’s ability to act as an effective watchdog was

53. RICHARD CALLAND, THE FIRST 5 YEARS: A REVIEW
DEMOCRATIC PARLIAMENT 36 (1999).
54. Id. at 35.
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further undermined by its own dalliance in addressing a
pattern of systematic abuse by MPs from across the political
spectrum. The first inklings of what would come to be known
as “travelgate” surfaced in the year 2000, when Speaker of
Parliament, Frene Ginwala, publicly rebuked two MPs for
abusing travel vouchers granted annually in a check-book
type format to allow MPs to travel between Parliament in
Cape Town and their constituencies or homes around the
country.55 By the time the scandal unraveled in 2007 it
embroiled more than 100 MPs who were forced to resign,
plead guilty and enter into plea-bargains to repay millions of
Rands to Parliament for fraudulent claims; or were brought
to trial and convicted as a result of their misuse or even the
sale of their parliamentary travel allocations for private
benefit. Even more damaging has been the fact that “senior
ANC leaders and Cabinet members involved have, in most
instances, quietly paid back the money that was defrauded
from Parliament.”56 As a result, the integrity of the
institution was severely compromised since the toleration of
corrupt practices within Parliament made it harder to claim
the high ground when policing similar practices in the
Executive.
While Parliament has always been the primary source of
formal law-making in South Africa, it has historically never
managed to serve very effectively as a watchdog. This may,
of course, be attributed to a number of both structural and
conventional conditions. First, as a fused-system, in which
the executive is part of a legislature dominated by the ruling
party, it would be a surprise if it really was able to hold the
government accountable in the face of party solidarity.
Second, the parliamentary tradition has long seen major
problems of accountability or disaster channelled into
government-appointed Commissions of Enquiry that are

55. ANDREW FEINSTEIN, AFTER THE PARTY: A PERSONAL
JOURNEY INSIDE THE ANC 241–42 (2007).
56. Id. at 242.
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called upon to investigate and address questions of
government failure and malfeasance. At Westminster, the
parliamentary custom of ministerial responsibility—and
quick, quiet resignation at the slightest hint of impropriety—
has historically narrowed the institutional space for robust
investigation or confrontation of a ruling party and its
conduct in government. Instead, a government may fall or
call an early election, but even in London, there is an
increasing tendency for the executive to brave its way
through by actively attempting to “spin” public opinion while
abandoning the custom of taking formal responsibility and
accepting the resignation of those identified as culprits.
Instead, governments are increasingly leaving the process of
managing political and public service malfeasance to the
courts through various processes of judicial review—either
administrative law or, where appropriate, constitutional
review.
Even if parliamentary systems have never served as
effective watchdogs, given the dominance of the ruling party
and members of government within the institution, this does
not mean that parliamentarians do not at times take up this
role with some forcefulness. South Africa’s pre-1994
apartheid Parliament did not, however, have such a
tradition. Instead, the colonial and apartheid regimes that
governed until 1994 maintained an “entire social
edifice . . . structured to enrich a powerful few at the expense
of the majority.”57 In the period between 1948 and 1994,
Parliament served as a rubber stamp for the decisions of the
National Party and executive. There were “many pressure
groups, such as the wine farmers . . . who used their close
proximity to Parliament to ‘take people to parties’ and
provide them with a quota of wine annually[.]”58
Furthermore, the increasing secrecy of the apartheid regime

57. DAN O’MEARA, FORTY LOST YEARS 231 (1996).
58. HENNIE VAN VUUREN, INST.
CORRUPTION 25 (2006).
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and the expansion of covert operations after 1976—as well as
the “history of routinised corruption”59 in central government
departments and the “homeland” administrations—provide
ample evidence for the following claim by Frene Ginwala, the
Speaker of South Africa’s first democratic Parliament:
[I]n South Africa we inherited an intrinsically corrupt system of
governance . . . To survive, it created a legal framework that was
based on and facilitated corruption. It has taken years in
Parliament to repeal old laws and introduce even the basic legal
framework that would enable us to deal with corrupt bureaucrats,
politicians and police. The private sector also operated in a closed
society and profited by it. There were partnerships with
international criminals and the corruption that was built into the
system is very difficult to overcome.60

In contrast to this history, South Africa’s first truly
democratic legislature seemed in its early years to be
committed to diligently exercising its duty to act as a public
watchdog. The relative strength of the legislature during
these early years may be attributed to two factors. First, the
initial post-apartheid Parliament, established under the
interim Constitution, served simultaneously as the national
legislature and as the Constitutional Assembly responsible
for writing South Africa’s final Constitution. Given this
historic Constitution-making responsibility, it is no surprise
that many of the most prominent politicians and antiapartheid activists, from across three generations, were
nominated and elected to serve in this first Parliament.
Second, these individuals were held in high esteem and
wielded enormous political authority within the ANC, which
meant that there was a de facto as well as formal distribution
of power between the legislature and the executive. This
balance was also enabled by Nelson Mandela’s explicit plea
that even he, as President, be held accountable by the
collective leadership of the ANC.
59. TOM LODGE, SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS SINCE 1994 60 (1999).
60. Frene Ginwala, Speaker of Parliament, Remarks to the Opening Session
at Global Forum II, The Hague (May 21, 2001), as reprinted in VAN VUUREN, supra
note 58, at 5–6.
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The confidence of these parliamentarians was evident in
the early practice of the parliamentary committees, which
would ask probing questions of high-ranking civil servants
and Ministers and, at times, take them to task. At the same
time, however, the committees lacked the resources to
adequately research and investigate issues. This problem
was exacerbated by the historic physical separation of
government: the executive and administrative departments
were located in Pretoria, while the legislature was situated
more than one thousand kilometers away in Cape Town. In
a short time, however, the tendency of the executive to
recruit many of the most effective politicians into the Cabinet
and the tendency of Committee Chairs to use their positions
to promote their political careers meant that those members
who were within the government increasingly dominated
Parliament. The ruling party became correspondingly more
centralized and concerned with protecting the image of the
government rather than raising questions about the
implementation of policy or the integrity of government
programs and officials.
Apart from Parliament, there are a number of legal and
constitutional institutions that have the duty and authority
to provide accountability for individuals and government
offices engaged in corruption and maladministration. 61 First
among these is the criminal law which, aside from a range of
anti-corruption statutes, includes specialized institutions
whose task it is to address organized crime and corruption.
The disbandment of the original Directorate of Special
Operations (known as the “scorpions”) sparked a series of
court cases challenging the government’s anti-corruption
efforts; this saw the Constitutional Court recognize that the
government has an obligation “arising out of the
Constitution . . . to establish effective mechanisms for

61. See generally Heinz Klug, Accountability and the Role of Independent
Constitutional Institutions in South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Constitutions, 60
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 153 (2015–2016).
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battling corruption.”62 In addition to the criminal law, the
post-apartheid constitutional order creates a number of
“integrity institutions” to ensure transparency and public
accountability
for
government
spending
and
maladministration. It was after the Public Protector, Thuli
Madonsela, issued her report on the “security upgrade” at
President Zuma’s rural home at Nkandla in March 2014,
that the question of that institution’s constitutional role and
independence headed to the courts.
RESISTING STATE CAPTURE
As far as some in the ruling party were concerned, the
Public Protector was responsible to Parliament, which they
felt had the right to both question the activities of the
institution as well as decide whether the decisions of the
Public Protector should be implemented. In support of their
claim they pointed to section 181(5) of the Constitution which
states that the Public Protector, along with the other
Chapter Nine institutions is “accountable to the National
Assembly.” In contrast to this broad claim of parliamentary
authority, the Public Protector has, in each annual report
since its founding, pointed out that section 182(1) empowers
the institution to investigate, report, and “take appropriate
remedial action.” Finally, the Public Protector has pointed to
section 181(2) of the Constitution which states that the
Chapter Nine “institutions are independent, and subject only
to the Constitution and the law, and they must be impartial
and must exercise their powers and perform their functions
without fear, favor or prejudice.”63
The first opportunity for the courts to address this
question came when the official political opposition, the
Democratic Alliance, brought a suit demanding a court order
that Hlaudi Motsoeneng, the Chief Operations Officer (COO)
62. Glenister v. President of the Republic of South Africa (Glenister II) 2011
(3) SA 347 (CC) para. 84 (S. Afr.).
63. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 181(2).
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of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC)—the
government broadcaster—be immediately suspended.64
Their claim was based on the Report of the Public Protector
into allegations of maladministration, systemic corporate
governance deficiencies, and abuse of power by the COO as
well as a claim that his appointment by the Board of the
SABC was irregular.65 While the Western Cape High Court
ordered that Motsoeneng be suspended and that the SABC
Board institute disciplinary proceedings against him,66 the
court’s decision on the powers of the Public Protector led to
some confusion. On the one hand the court ruled that the
decisions of the SABC Board and the Minister of
Communications to ignore the recommendations of the
Public
Protector
were
irrational
and
therefore
67
unconstitutional.
On the other hand, Judge Alvin
Schippers also held that the Public Protector’s findings are
not directly binding and enforceable since they do not have
the same legal status as court orders.68 Using the Supreme
Court of Appeals and Constitutional Court’s earlier decisions
analogizing the Public Protector to the position of an
ombudsman in other jurisdictions,69 Judge Schippers argued
that while the recommendations of the Public Protector are
not binding, the government officials to whom they are
directed are not free to disregard them based on their own
conclusion but rather need to either implement them or
provide rational reasons for refusing to do so.70 This decision,
an exercise of public power in its own right, would be subject
to review by the Courts as would any decision by the Public

64. Democratic All. v. S. Afr. Broad. Corp., 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC) para. 1 (S.
Afr.).
65. Id. paras. 4–5.
66. Id. paras. 88, 97.
67. Id. para. 82.
68. Id. para. 51.
69. Id. paras. 50–74.
70. Id. para. 74.
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Protector that may be challenged by those affected by the
Public Protectors findings or recommendations. 71
This tension, between the constitutional mandate that
“[o]ther organs of state . . . must assist and protect these
institutions to ensure the independence, impartiality,
dignity, and effectiveness of these institutions,”72 and the
seeming inability of the Public Protector to ensure that the
institutions findings and recommendations were addressed
by the government lay at the heart of the separation of
powers question that the High court’s judgment in
Democratic Alliance v. South African Broadcasting
Corporation did not effectively resolve. While the court did
note in defense of its own powers that “the rule of separation
of powers cannot be used to avoid the obligation of a court to
provide appropriate relief that is just and equitable to a
litigant who successfully raises a constitutional complaint,” 73
its decision to equate the Public Protector with the British
ombudsman failed to acknowledge that the legislative
authority of the ombudsman in the United Kingdom is
legally distinct from the constitutional status enjoyed by the
Chapter Nine institutions and the Public Protector in
particular. Even if the Supreme Court of Appeal and the
Constitutional Court analogized the Public Protector to
similar ombudsmen institutions in other jurisdictions, these
courts had not yet directly addressed the question of how the
constitution imagines the role of the Chapter Nine bodies as
“state institutions supporting constitutional democracy.” 74
The difficulty in managing the relationship between the
Public Protector and the government became acutely obvious
when the Public Protector sought clarity over to whom she
should submit her report on the expenditures on the
President’s home at Nkandla, since the Report was in part

71. See id. para 71.
72. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 181(3).
73. Democratic All., (1) SA 551, para. 99.
74. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 9.
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an investigation into benefits received by the President. 75
The necessity of asking this question only served to highlight
the more general question about the precise constitutional
status of the Public Protector and the other Chapter Nine
institutions. Even if we conceive of Chapter Nine as creating
an additional branch of government, as I have argued, this
does not resolve questions about the precise relationship of
checks and balances that a separation of powers
understanding requires. It is this challenge that first the
Supreme Court of Appeal and then the Constitutional Court
took up in both the SABC appeal and the Economic Freedom
Fighters case.
When the case reached the Supreme Court of Appeal,
(SCA) the Constitutional Court upheld the decision of the
High Court requiring the SABC to subject its Chief
Operating Officer to a disciplinary hearing and noted that
“[i]n modern democratic constitutional States, in order to
ensure governmental accountability, it has become necessary
for the guards to require a guard. And in terms of our
constitutional scheme, it is the Public Protector who guards
the guards.”76 The SCA then rejected the High Court’s
analogizing of the public protector to the British
Parliamentary ombudsperson, noting that “the powers
conferred on the Public Protector in terms of § 182(1)(c) of
the Constitution far exceeded those of similar institutions in
comparable jurisdictions.”77 Responding to the government
counsel’s suggestion that the powers of the Public Protector
are defined by legislation rather than the Constitution, the
SCA argued that “[t]he problem with that suggestion is that
the Constitution is the primary source and it stipulates and
refers to ‘additional’ powers to be prescribed by national

75. PUBLIC PROTECTOR, SECURE IN COMFORT 426 (2014).
76. S. Afr. Broad. Corp. v. Democratic All. 2015 (4) All SA 719 (SCA) para. 3
(S. Afr.).
77. Id. para. 43.
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legislation.”78 Thus the suggestion that the Public Protector’s
powers are legislatively defined is “contrary to the
constitutional and legislative scheme outlined above and
would have the effect of the tail wagging the dog.”79
Declaring the government’s establishment of a parallel
process to “investigate the veracity of the findings and
recommendations of the Public Protector . . . [to be]
impermissible,”80 the SCA argued that the “Public Protector
cannot realise the constitutional purpose of her office if other
organs of State may second-guess her findings and ignore her
recommendations.”81 Summing up its judgement, the SCA
noted that:
the office of the Public Protector, like all Chapter Nine institutions,
is a venerable one. Our constitutional compact demands that
remedial action taken by the Public Protector should not be ignored.
State institutions are obliged to heed the principles of co-operative
governance as prescribed by § 41 of the Constitution. Any affected
person or institution aggrieved by a finding, decision or action taken
by the Public Protector might, in appropriate circumstances,
challenge that by way of a review application. Absent a review
application, however, such person is not entitled to simply ignore
the findings, decision or remedial action taken by the Public
Protector.82

Referring back to the decision of the High Court, the SCA
drew a significant distinction between the status of the
Public Protector under the 1993 interim Constitution and
the final 1996 Constitution; it argued that the suggestion
that the Public Protector had merely the power to
recommend “appears to be more consistent with the
language of the Interim Constitution and is neither fitting
nor effective, denudes the office of the Public Protector of any

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. para. 47.
81. Id. para. 52.
82. Id. para. 53.
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meaningful content, and defeats its purpose.”83 Noting that
all parties to the litigation found the metaphor of a watchdog
“a useful metaphor for the Public Protector” the SCA
concluded that “this watchdog should not be muzzled.”84
As conflict over the role of President Zuma in the corrupt
practices of the Gupta family grew, different political parties,
non-government organizations, and the President himself
increasingly turned to the courts. First, there were a series
of cases challenging the authority of the Public Protector,
particularly with respect to that institution’s remedial
powers. Second, there was a set of cases in which the
opposition parties in Parliament approached the
Constitutional Court in an attempt to force the ruling party
in Parliament to hold the President accountable. Finally,
there was a wave of legal challenges to the legitimacy of
executive appointments and actions taken in the
appointment, suspension and buying-out of the leadership of
those government institutions that have the responsibility to
investigate corruption and official malfeasance.
Unlike the SABC case, which wound its way up through
the lower courts, the conflict over the failure of President
Zuma to “pay back the money” as required by the Public
Protector’s report on the public money spent on his Nkandla
residence and Parliament’s decision that he owed nothing
brought the question of the Public Protector’s powers directly
to the Constitutional Court.85 In its dramatic decision—read
out on national television by Chief Justice Mogoeng
Mogoeng—the Constitutional Court linked the response to
the Public Protector’s report to the Constitution’s
foundational commitment to the rule of law, arguing that:
One of the crucial elements of our constitutional vision is to make a
decisive break from the unchecked abuse of State power and

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Econ. Freedom Fighters v. Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly 2016 (3) SA 580
(CC) para. 2 (S. Afr.).
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resources that was virtually institutionalised during the apartheid
era. To achieve this goal, we adopted accountability, the rule of law
and the supremacy of the Constitution as values of our
constitutional democracy. For this reason, public office-bearers
ignore their constitutional obligations at their peril. This is so
because constitutionalism, accountability and the rule of law
constitute the sharp and mighty sword that stands ready to chop
the ugly head of impunity off its stiffened neck.86

Discussing the institution of the Public Protector, the Court
noted that to achieve its objectives, “it is required to be
independent and subject only to the Constitution and the
law.”87 This requirement, the Court stated, “would not
ordinarily be required of an institution whose powers or
decisions are by constitutional design always supposed to be
ineffectual. Whether it is impartial or not would be irrelevant
if the implementation of the decisions it takes is at the mercy
of those against whom they are made.”88 The Court
concluded that that the “constitutional safeguards in
section 181 would also be meaningless if institutions
purportedly established to strengthen our constitutional
democracy lacked even the remotest possibility to do so.”89
Detailing the constitutional place of the Public Protector,
the Court argued that “[i]n the execution of her investigative,
reporting or remedial powers, she is not to be inhibited,
undermined or sabotaged”90 and “[w]hen all other essential
requirements for the proper exercise of her power are met,
she is to take appropriate remedial action.”91 Justifying its
conclusions in the name of strengthening constitutional
democracy and “breathing life into the remedial powers of
the Public Protector,” the court held that “she must have the
resources and capacities necessary to effectively execute her

86. Id. para. 1.
87. Id. para. 49.
88. Id. para. 49.
89. Id.
90. Id. para. 54.
91. Id.
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mandate[.]”92 Rooting the Public Protector’s powers within
the Constitution, the Court made clear that legislation is not
able to “eviscerate” the powers provided by the Constitution
as the “power to take remedial action is primarily sourced
from the supreme law itself. And the powers and functions
conferred on the Public Protector by the Act owe their very
existence or significance to the Constitution.”93
At the same time, the Constitutional Court recognized
that the “Public Protector’s power to take appropriate
remedial action is wide but certainly not unfettered” and that
the “remedial action is always open to judicial scrutiny.”94
Furthermore, “[w]hen remedial action is binding, compliance
is not optional, whatever reservations the affected party
might have about its fairness, appropriateness or lawfulness.
For this reason, the remedial action taken against those
under investigation cannot be ignored without any legal
consequences.”95 The reason for this conclusion the Court
argued is because “our constitutional order hinges also on the
rule of law. No decision grounded on the Constitution or law
may be disregarded without recourse to a court of law. To do
otherwise would ‘amount to a licence to self-help.’”96
According to the Court:
The rule of law requires that no power be exercised unless it is
sanctioned by law and no decision or step sanctioned by law may be
ignored based purely on a contrary view we hold. It is not open to
any of us to pick and choose which of the otherwise effectual
consequences of the exercise of constitutional or statutory power
will be disregarded and which given heed to. Our foundational value
of the rule of law demands of us, as a law-abiding people, to obey
decisions made by those clothed with the legal authority to make
them or else approach courts of law to set them aside, so we may

92. Id.
93. Id. para. 64.
94. Id. para. 71.
95. Id. para. 73.
96. Id. para. 74.
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validly escape their binding force.”97

In conclusion the Court held that due to his manifest
failure in disregarding the “remedial action taken against
him by the Public Protector in terms of her constitutional
powers” as well as his failure to “assist and protect the Public
Protector so as to ensure her independence, impartiality,
dignity and effectiveness by complying with her remedial
action” the President has “failed to uphold, defend and
respect the Constitution as the supreme law of the land.”98
Addressing the actions of the national legislature, the
Court was careful to explain its own role within the checks
and balances implicit in the constitutional structure. Noting
that it “falls outside the parameters of judicial authority to
prescribe to the National Assembly how to scrutinise
executive action,”99 the Court argued that the “mechanics of
how to go about fulfilling these constitutional obligations is
a discretionary matter best left to the National Assembly.”100
By comparison, the role of the Court, Chief Justice Mogoeng
argued, “is a much broader and less intrusive role. And that
is to determine whether what the National Assembly did
does in substance and in reality amount to fulfilment of its
constitutional obligations. That is the sum-total of the
constitutionally permissible judicial enquiry to be embarked
upon.”101 Describing these as “some of the ‘vital limits on
judicial authority and the Constitution’s design to leave
certain matters to other branches of government[,]’”102 he
concluded that “[c]ourts should not interfere in the processes
of other branches of government unless otherwise authorised

97. Id. para. 75.
98. Id. para. 83.
99. Id. para. 93.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting Doctors for Life Int’l v. Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly 2006 (6)
SA 416 (CC) para. 37 (S. Afr.)).
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by the Constitution.”103 However he went on to state that
[c]ourts ought not to blink at the thought of asserting their
authority, whenever it is constitutionally permissible to do so,
irrespective of the issues or who is involved. At the same time, and
mindful of the vital strictures of their powers, they must be on high
alert against impermissible encroachment on the powers of the
other arms of government.”104

Despite these caveats the Constitutional Court found
that “there was everything wrong with the National
Assembly stepping into the shoes of the Public Protector”
and that “by passing a resolution that purported effectively
to nullify the findings made and remedial action taken by the
Public Protector and replacing them with its own findings
and ‘remedial action,’” the National Assembly’s action was
“inconsistent with the Constitution and unlawful.”105 This,
the Court stated, “the rule of law is dead against. It is
another way of taking the law into one’s hands and thus
constitutes self-help.”106
While challenges to the nature of the remedial powers of
the Public Protector were thus resolved by the Constitutional
Court in the Nkandla case, the most recent challenge saw
President Zuma attempt to prevent the release by the
outgoing Public Protector of a report on state capture.
Bringing an urgent application on October 13, 2016, the
President argued that the Public Protector should be
prevented “from finalizing and releasing that report”. 107
After the President learned that the Report was in fact
already finalized and would be released, his lawyers
continued to bring urgent applications to the courts; however
once the court was ready to hear arguments the President’s

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. paras. 98–99.
106. Id. para. 98.
107. President of the Republic of South Africa v. Office of the Public Protector
2017 (1) All SA 576 (GP) para. 1 (S. Afr.).
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lawyers simply withdrew the application and offered to pay
the costs of the other parties who had challenged the initial
attempt to prevent the release of the Report. As a result, a
number of the other parties brought an application
demanding that the President pay for these legal costs
himself since he had claimed his challenge to the report was
to protect his own dignity and interests. In an opinion on the
same day, also written on behalf of a full bench by Judge
President Mlambo, the head judge of the Gauteng Division
of the High Court of South Africa, the High Court found
President Zuma personally responsible for all the legal costs
from the day that he was informed that the Report had in
fact been finalized.
In his substantive challenge to the Public Protector’s
Report on state capture, the President objected to the
decision by the Public Protector that called upon the
President to establish a judicial Commission of Inquiry into
state capture but required the head of the commission to be
nominated by the Chief Justice of South Africa rather than
the President as provided for in the Constitution.108 In its
decision on this question, the High Court argued that while
the “power to appoint a commission of inquiry vests in the
President alone and only he can exercise that power[,]” it
does not follow “that there are no constraints upon the
exercise” of this power.109 The High Court went on to argue
that “even though the Constitution vests in the President the
power to appoint a commission of inquiry, this power is not
an untrammelled one; it must be exercised within the
constraints that the Constitution imposes. The President’s
power to appoint a commission of inquiry will necessarily be
curtailed where his ability to conduct himself without
constraint brings him into conflict with his obligations under

108. President of the Republic of South Africa v. Office of the Public Protector
2017 (1) All SA 800 (GP) (S. Afr.).
109. Id. para. 62.
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the Constitution.”110
Faced with a refusal by the ANC majority in Parliament
to hold President Zuma and his government accountable for
a pattern of corruption that was being openly discussed in
the country’s print and electronic media, the opposition
parties also turned to the Courts. The focus of these cases
was an attempt to force the leadership in Parliament, and
particularly the Speaker of Parliament, to bring a vote of no
confidence to the floor of the National Assembly for debate
and vote. First, the Constitutional Court issued a decision
that required the dominant party to allow the opposition
parties to bring a vote of no confidence to the floor.111 A year
later, the Court issued another ruling indicating that
although the decision lay with the Speaker of Parliament,
any decision made by the Speaker must be rational; and
while it was not for the Court to decide, it would seem most
rational if the Speaker decided to allow a secret vote on the
motion.112 Despite the Speaker of Parliament’s subsequent
decision to hold a vote of no confidence in secret as well as
massive countrywide demonstrations calling for action
against corruption, President Zuma survived his seventh no
confidence vote on August 8, 2017. The significance of this
vote however was the fact that when the vote was tallied, it
became clear that members of the President’s own party had,
for the first time, voted against him, highlighting the
growing rift in the ANC.113
In another case brought by the parliamentary
opposition, a majority on the Constitutional Court found that
Parliament had failed in its constitutional duty to hold the
President accountable for failing to implement the Public
110. Id. para. 71.
111. Mazibuko v. Sisulu 2013 (6) SA 249 (CC) (S. Afr.).
112. United Democratic Movement v. Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly 2017 (5) SA
300 (CC) paras. 93–94 (S. Afr.).
113. Niren Tolsi, Zuma Survives No-confidence Vote Despite ANC Dissenters,
MAIL & GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2017, 5:11 PM), https://mg.co.za/article/2017-08-08-noconfidence-vote-the-people-versus-jacob-zuma.
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Protector’s Nkandla Report.114 Accountability in this context
is separate from a motion of no confidence since the
Constitution provides a separate standard and consequences
for impeachment of the President. The opposition parties
pointed out that Parliament had not established any
procedures for an impeachment process and a majority of the
Court held that Parliament had a constitutional duty to
create a regulatory structure for the implementation of
section 89 of the Constitution which provides for the
impeachment of the President by two-thirds of the National
Assembly if the President is in “serious violation of the
Constitution” has engaged in “serious misconduct” or is
unable to perform the functions of the office.115
The final set of cases involve those challenging the hiring
and firing of government officials, often involving very large
settlements. Among these, an extraordinary decision,
Corruption Watch v. President of the Republic of South
Africa, was handed down by a full bench of the High Court of
South Africa (Gauteng Division) on December 8, 2017. 116 In
this case, the High Court invalidated the termination of the
appointment of yet another Director of Public Prosecutions,
Mxolisi Nxasana, as well as the settlement reached between
him, the President, and the Minister of Justice which
awarded him R17,3 million while declaring that he was a fit
and proper person to hold the office.117 As a consequence of
this holding, the High Court also declared the appointment
of then sitting Director of Public Prosecutions, Shaun
Abrahams, invalid.118 Furthermore, given the sustained
criticism of Abrahams for failing to bring charges of
corruption against the President, or even to investigate the
114. Econ. Freedom Fighters v. Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly 2018 (2) SA 571
(CC) para. 276 (S. Afr.).
115. Id. para. 212; S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 89.
116. Corruption Watch v. President of the Republic of South Africa 2017
ZAGPPHC 742 (S. Afr.).
117. Id. paras. 3, 77.
118. Id. para. 128.
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claims against the Guptas, the Court held that the President
had a conflict of interest and therefore a new Director of
Public Prosecutions must be appointed by the then Deputy
President of the country—Cyril Ramaphosa—who was also
given the constitutional authority, normally exercised by the
President, to make all decisions involving the appointment,
suspension or removal of the Director of Public Prosecutions
so long as the incumbent President remains in office.119 This
reallocation of the President’s constitutional authority was
an extraordinary remedy but one designed to preserve the
integrity of the prosecuting authority which many argued
had been “captured” and was no longer performing its
functions without fear or favor as required by the
Constitution.
These decisions, announced within the same period as
the ANC’s National Elective Conference, during which the
party elected a new president, Cyril Ramaphosa, set the
stage for the next round of political conflict. After Jacob
Zuma was no longer the leader of the ANC and his own
preferred candidate had failed to be elected, the possibility of
the ruling party “recalling” him from the Presidency of the
country was placed on the political agenda. Faced with this
threat, President Zuma finally complied with the remedy
imposed by the Public Protector in her “State of Capture”
report, by announcing in January of 2018 that he would
appoint a Commission of Enquiry into State Capture to be
headed by the Deputy Chief Justice who was nominated by
the Chief Justice as required by the Public Protector.
However, the senior leadership of the ANC remained split
and the possibility of President Zuma resigning under threat
of impeachment in Parliament—which would deny him all
pension and other benefits—was floated as a possibility.
While the ANC survived the 2019 election, it remains true
that this was the first time they were concerned they might
lose the majority, and, in fact, they still suffered significant

119. Id.
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losses despite forcing Zuma to resign.
While the struggle for political power and against
corruption continues in the ANC, the narrow defeat of Jacob
Zuma’s political faction by Cyril Ramaphosa’s anticorruption platform at the end of 2017, produced the chance
for political change both within the dominant party and the
state. The overarching importance of these internal party
conflicts to South Africa’s constitutional democracy reflects
the unipolar structure of South African politics. So long as
the ANC remains a dominant party at the national level—
despite losing major metropolitan areas in the 2016 local
government elections—there exists a form of dual state in
which the party and state are deeply entwined. Under Jacob
Zuma, this relationship led to the emergence of a form of
“shadow state” in which corrupt private interests seem to
have gained ascendency over even formal party structures by
attaching themselves to a network of corrupt regional and
national government leaders within the party. While the
existence of networks, corrupt or otherwise, within polities is
not unique to South Africa, or even dominant party
democracies, the relative weakness of opposition parties and
the remote chance of electoral punishment makes combating
these systems of political relations and patronage more
difficult. It is, however, just such a network, including former
President Zuma himself, that has been increasingly
challenged from both within the party and through
constitutional means.
A marked feature of the struggle between different
factions within the ruling party and South Africa’s politicaleconomy more generally has been the use of law and the
impact on different constitutional and governmental
institutions. While President Thabo Mbeki was forced to
resign on the claim that he interfered in the corruption
prosecution of Jacob Zuma, the ascendance of the Zuma
faction led to the hollowing out of key state institutions—
such as the elite police anti-corruption unit, the prosecution
authorities, the widely respected tax authorities, as well as
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the intelligence services—and their increasing deployment
to protect Zuma from accusations of corruption. “State
capture” added a further dimension as private interests
began to directly dictate significant decisions, including
cabinet positions and executive appointments to the boards
of state-owned entities, producing grossly corrupt decisions
that benefitted the first family and their private
collaborators. Even as the executive used its appointment
powers to undermine each constitutional institution—
including the Public Protector—a political backlash gathered
ground from civil society, the political opposition, and from
within the ruling party itself. Resistance from within state
and constitutional institutions received increasing support
from the courts and the dramatic decrease in electoral
support for the ANC which led to the loss of major
metropolitan areas to opposition parties in the 2016 local
government elections finally produced a political revolt from
within the ruling party which forced Zuma’s resignation from
the Presidency and saw the election by Parliament of Cyril
Ramaphosa as President in January 2018.
In addition to the integrity institutions, the question of
institutional independence arises more broadly when the
constitution imposes an obligation on the state to address
particular problems, such as corruption and organized crime.
In Glenister v. President of the Republic of South Africa, the
Constitutional Court addressed the “validity of national
legislation that brought into being the Directorate for
Priority Crime Investigation . . . [the Hawks] and disbanded
the Directorate of Special Operations . . . [the Scorpions].”120
Noting that “[e]ndemic corruption threatens the injunction
that government must be accountable, responsive and open;
that public administration must not only be held to account
but must also be governed by high standards of ethics,
efficiency and must use public resources in an economic and

120. Glenister v. President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC)
para. 160 (S. Afr.).
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effective manner[,]”121 the Court asked two questions. First,
whether the South African Constitution “imposes an
obligation on the state to establish and maintain an
independent body to combat corruption and organised
crime”; and second, “whether the specialised unit which the
impugned legislation has established . . . meets the
requirement of independence.”122
Recognizing that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
“enshrine rights of all people in South Africa” and that
“Section 7(2) . . . requires the state to ‘respect, protect,
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights’”123 the
Court found that there is “a duty to create efficient anticorruption mechanisms.”124 Furthermore, the majority of the
Court held that “to fulfil its duty to ensure that the rights in
the Bill of Rights are protected and fulfilled, the state must
create an anti-corruption entity with the necessary
independence, and that this obligation is constitutionally
enforceable.”125
CONCLUSION: INTEGRITY INSTITUTIONS AND THE TEMPERING
OF POWER

The existence of a constitutional duty to create an
independent anti-corruption entity as well as the
constitutional independence for entities outside of the control
of any of the traditional tres politica has become a central
feature of a distinctly South African conception of the
separation of powers. This conception of multiple
independent entities within the overall system of checks and
balances that forms a distinctly South African separation of
powers was central to the Nkandla case126 and was reflected
121. Id. para. 176.
122. Id. para. 163.
123. Id. para. 177.
124. Id.
125. Id. para. 197.
126. Econ. Freedom Fighters v. Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly 2016 (3) SA 580
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in the whole set of cases that flowed from the struggle
against state capture. While the separation of powers is often
understood to be a means to protect human rights, the
history of integrity institutions in the South African
constitutional order demonstrates that the distribution of
power beyond the tres publica may serve an additional
purpose, that is, to temper power. A focus on institutional
integrity has served in this context to ensure that the
separation of powers serves to both set the limits on the
power that might be exercised by different public institutions
but also guarantees their power so as to ensure the effective
implementation of the Constitution. To this extent, the
outcome is to further the overall constitutional vision of
social transformation by empowering each sphere of
government to exercise the power necessary to affect the
goals of the Constitution. At the same time, concern with the
institutional integrity of each sphere of government requires
that power be neither corrupted nor abused.
This reading of the Constitutional Court’s separation of
powers jurisprudence argues that the doctrine functions first
and foremost as an inducement to each branch of the state to
make its optimum positive contribution (in view of its special
capacities or competence) toward the goal of achieving the
Constitution’s social-transformative aims—a goal that
includes but is by no means limited to the protection of
individual rights, and that is equally concerned with how
democratic constitutionalism might really work under
current South African conditions as with any theoretical
model. Now, if optimal positive contribution from each
branch is the guiding aim, then contributions from the
different branches and independent institutions would, of
course, include provocations from each to the others to give
due consideration to certain actions or policies that lie within
those others’ domains; it would also include also resistance
from each against overstepping by the others that unduly

(CC) (S. Afr.).
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infringes on their own work. But then the system has
boundaries, however supple and context-dependent these
may be, and who polices the boundaries?
With that question comes something distinctive about
the South African conception of the separation of powers. By
comparison with most other constitutions, South Africa’s is
especially outspoken and explicit about assigning to the
judicial branch, and particularly the Constitutional Court,
two specific responsibilities. First, by designating the
Constitutional Court as the final arbiter of constitutional
interpretation the Constitution allocates to this institution a
special and supreme responsibility and authority to set the
inter-branch boundaries of due and undue cross-branch
provocation so as to protect the working spaces of the
different branches of government. Second, the judiciary, and
the Constitutional Court in particular, has a responsibility
to act against internal breakdowns within the branches
(itself included) by way of inattention or corruption. But that
then creates a special challenge to the Constitutional
Court—to carry out these missions with full commitment,
while at the same time restraining itself against undue
invasion of the provinces of the others. This dynamic was in
evidence when the Constitutional Court was called upon to
decide whether the government’s disbandment of an effective
anti-corruption unit—the scorpions—was constitutional. In
an unusually divided opinion, the Constitutional Court split
five to four on the question of whether the legislation was
unconstitutional. Furthermore, while the majority found
that the legislation did not provide adequate independence
for the anti-corruption body created by the law, it granted
the legislature eighteen months to remedy the constitutional
infirmity. The tempering of power in this context emerged
from the institutional dialogue between the court and the
legislature provided for by the availability of a specific form
of constitutional remedy—the ability of the Court to suspend
a declaration of constitutional invalidity so as to give the
legislature time to act.

